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Careful With That Gun: 
Lee, George, Wax, and Geach on  







 About half of Americans think that homosexual sex is 
morally wrong.
1
 More than half oppose same-sex marriage.
2
  
                                                 
*  John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political 
Science, Northwestern University.  Thanks to Marcia Lehr and Michelle 
Shaw for research assistance, and to June Carbone, Mary Anne Case, Mary 
Geach, Martha Nussbaum, and Dorothy Roberts for helpful comments. 
1 This number is however shrinking.  The Gallup poll found in 1982 that 
only 34 percent of respondents agreed that “homosexuality should be 
considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle.”  The number increased 
to 50 percent in 1999 and 57 percent in 2007.  Lydia Saad, Americans 
Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, June 18, 2008, available 
at http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-
Homosexuality.aspx (visited April 27, 2009).  In 2001, 53% of Americans 
thought that homosexual relations were morally wrong, while 40% 
considered them morally acceptable; in 2008, the split was 48 to 48.  
Id. 
2 According to Gallup, 57% oppose same-sex marriage.  Jeffrey M. Jones,  
Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, May 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/Majority-Americans-
Continue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx (visited Oct. 14, 2009).  But there 
is a sharp generational divide:  among those 18 to 34 years old, 58 
percent supported same-sex marriages.  That number drops to 42 percent 
among respondents aged 35 to 49, to 41 percent of those aged 50 to 64, 
and only 24 percent of Americans 65 and older.  Paul Steinhauser, CNN 
Poll:  Generations Disagree on Same-Sex Marriage, May 4, 2009, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/04/samesex.marriage.poll/ 
(visited July 2, 2009).  Other polls reach similar results.  Arian 
Campo-Flores, A Gay Marriage Surge, Newsweek, Dec. 5, 2008, available 
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/172399 (visited July 2, 2009); Adam 
Nagourney, On Politics:  Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking Stance on Gay 
Marriage, Apr. 28, 2008.  The effect is even noticeable among white 
evangelical Christians, otherwise a very conservative lot:  58 percent 
of those 18-29 years old support some legal recognition of same-sex 
couples, with 26 percent supporting marriage rights.  Only 46 percent 
of those over 30 support any legal recognition, with 9 percent 
supporting marriage.  Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc., Young 
Evangelical Christians and the 2008 Election, Sept. 29 2008, available 
at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID=2251 (visited Oct. 22, 
2009).  Older evangelicals also care much more about the issue:  
according to a Pew Forum study, 61.8 percent of those over 60 said that 
“stopping gay marriage” was very important, while only 34 percent of 
 2 
Philosophers trying to defend these views have relied on 
two strategies.  One is to claim that such sex is wrong 
irrespective of consequences:  there is something intrinsic 
to sex that makes it only licit when it takes place within 
a heterosexual marriage (in which there is no contraception 
or possibility of divorce).  This argument‟s weakness is 
that it moves so quickly from premise to conclusion:  
unless you perceive marriage, as defined in this peculiar 
way, to be intrinsically good, the argument can‟t even get 
started.  The second strategy focuses on consequences:  the 
baleful effects on heterosexual families of societal 
tolerance for homosexuality. This argument has foundered 
for lack of evidence.
3
 
 This article is a critique of recent attempts to 
reinvigorate these strategies.  Patrick Lee and Robert P. 
George have offered clarifications of the first strategy in 
order to rebut objections from many scholars.  Amy Wax (who 
is not a clear opponent of same-sex marriage, but who is 
worried by it) has tried to array evidence to support the 
second.  Mary Geach has developed a novel hybrid, relying 
on the second argument to support the first one. 
The coherence problems of the first view remain.  Its 
deepest difficulty lies in its need to show that the 
intrinsic goodness of sex is at once (a) derived from its 
reproductive character and (b) present in the coitus of 
married couples who know themselves to be infertile, but 
not present in any sex act other than heterosexual marital 
coitus. 
As for evidence of bad consequences of tolerance of 
homosexuality, the evidence is all the other way.  The 
sexual ethic all these authors revere is indeed decaying.  
That is why they are alarmed.  But it is its remnants that 
are doing the most damage in contemporary society.  The 
growing tolerance of homosexuality is part of a larger 
shift in sexual ethics that separates sex from 
reproduction.  The effects have been good for some groups 
in American society and bad for others.  The good effects 
are concentrated among those who have most deeply absorbed 
the new ethic. Within that population, children are 
thriving, and they are thriving because their parents used 
                                                                                                                                                 
those 29 and under said so.  Steven Waldman, Abortion vs. 
Homosexuality:  The Evangelical Age Gap, 
http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/07/abortion-vs-
homosexuality-the.html (visited Oct. 22, 2009)(also citing similar data 
from Barna Research).   
3 I have previously examined both claims in The Decline and Fall of the 
Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 5 (2005). 
 3 
contraception in their early 20s, prolonged their 
educations, and delayed marriage and parenthood.  Similar 
behavior by more vulnerable populations would make them 
better off.  For opponents of homosexuality, relying on 
consequences is building one‟s house on dynamite. 
 
The intrinsic good of one-flesh union 
 
  Geach states the first claim succinctly: “the 
marriage act has an intrinsic meaning which does not depend 
on human convention, but which is part of the fabric and 
constitution of our nature, so that by damaging our sense 
of the significance of our sexuality we undermine that 
fabric and undo that constitution.”4  Part of the meaning of 
marriage as she understands it is that it is the only 
legitimate use of the sexual function.  Among the acts 
which distort the meaning of the marriage act are sex 
outside of marriage, contraception, divorce, masturbation, 
sexual fantasy, and homosexual conduct.  These are 
categorically immoral, and never permissible under any 
circumstances. 
 The view she puts forth has already been made 
prominently by the new natural law theorists (hereinafter 
NNL), the theologian Germain Grisez and the legal scholar 
and philosopher John Finnis, and further developed by 
Robert P. George, Gerard Bradley, and Patrick Lee.
5
  Central 
to their argument is the view that sex is only morally 
licit within marriage, which is “a basic and irreducible 
good perfective of human persons.”6  I cannot review their 
entire argument here,
7
 but will focus on their account of 
                                                 
4 Mary Geach, Lying With the Body, 91 The Monist 523, 525 (2008). 
5 She acknowledges her affinity with NNL in id. at 527. 
6 Robert P. George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It?  Marriage, Morality, 
and Rationality, in The Meaning of Marriage:  Family, State, Market, 
and Morals 142, 169 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 
2006). 
7 I have done so elsewhere.  See Koppelman, Decline and Fall; Andrew 
Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 80-93 
(2002); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 Am. 
J. Jurisprudence 51 (1997).  Since I wrote these pieces, Lee and George 
have elaborated considerably on their claims about the disintegrating 
effects of the pursuit of pleasure in Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, 
Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (2007), and they 
specifically respond to my objections in id. at 191-93.  I cannot 
address their general argument here.  I note, however, that their 
claims about the disordered character of nonmarital sex are parasitic 
upon their claims, which I do address below, that there is a distinct 
good achieved by the heterosexual couple, even if that couple is known 
to be infertile.  If that distinct good cannot intelligibly be shown, 
 4 
the distinctive good that they think is achieved by 
heterosexual marriage. 
 Marriage, Grisez argues, is an irreducible human good, 
because it constitutes “a full communion of persons: a 
communion of will by mutual covenantal commitment, and of 
organism by the generative act they share in”.8 Communion of 
will consists of a mutual commitment to an exclusive and 
indissoluble partnership, while organic communion consists 
in the fact that – here comes the boldest move of the NNL 
theorists, one that Geach does not make -- when husband and 
wife engage in procreative marital intercourse, they 
literally become a single organism. 
 For NNL “each animal is incomplete, for a male or a 
female . . . is only a potential part of the mated pair, 
which is the complete organism . . . capable of reproducing 
sexually. This is true also of men and women: as mates who 
engage in sexual intercourse suited to initiate new life, 
they complete each other and become an organic unit. In 
doing so, it is literally true that 'they become one flesh' 
(Gn 2.24)”.9  What looks like a metaphor in Genesis becomes 
a simple statement of fact in NNL.  The married couple, 
when mating, “truly become biologically one, one body.”10  
Nonmarital sexual acts, whether homosexual or 
heterosexual, cannot achieve this bodily unity. At best, 
they achieve the illusory experience of unity.  “For a 
truly common good, there must be more than experience; the 
experiences must be subordinated to a truly common act that 
is genuinely fulfilling”.11 When gay couples (or even 
married heterosexual couples) achieve sexual satisfaction 
by means other than marital intercourse, the act “is really 
an instance of mutual masturbation, and is as self-
alienating as any other instance of masturbation.” Thus 
Finnis writes of sex between unmarried people that 
their reproductive organs cannot make them a 
biological (and therefore personal) unit. . . . 
Because their activation of . . . their 
reproductive organs cannot be an actualizing and 
experiencing of the marital good . . . it can do 
no more than provide each partner with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
then, whatever the significance of pleasure might be, there is no 
radical difference between marital heterosexual sex and other kinds of 
sexual conduct. 
8 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2: Living a Christian 
Life 580 (1993). 
9 Id. at 570. 
10 Lee and George, Body-Self Dualism, at 199. 
11 Id. at 146. 
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individual gratification. For want of a common 
good that could be actualized . . . by and in 
this bodily union, that conduct involves the 
partners in treating their bodies as instruments 
to be used in the service of their consciously 
experiencing selves; their choice to engage in 
such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them 
precisely as acting persons.
12
 
Homosexual acts are wrong not only because they 
violate integrity, but also because they “violate the good 
of marriage”.13 Choosing nonmarital sex “damages the body‟s 
capacity for the marital act as an act of self-giving which 
constitutes a communion of bodily persons.”14 This damage is 
“a damage to the person as an integrated, acting being; it 
consists principally in that disposition of the will which 
is initiated by the choice to engage in” such sexual 
activity.
15
 Consider a married man who has never committed 
adultery, but who might be willing to do so if, say, his 
wife were unavailable when he felt strong sexual desire. 
The exclusivity of the man's sex with his wife is not an 
expression of commitment, because conditional willingness 
to commit adultery precludes commitment. He is thus 
motivated even in marital intercourse by something other 
than the good of marriage (which takes its meaning in part 
from being the only legitimate use of the sexual powers). 
This is why Finnis claims that the “complete exclusion of 
nonmarital sex acts from the range of acceptable and 
valuable human options is existentially, if not logically, 
a precondition for the truly marital character of one‟s 
intercourse as and with a spouse”.16 When one damages that 
precondition, one damages marriage, since “to damage an 
intrinsic and necessary condition for attaining a good is 
to damage that good itself”.17 
 The new natural lawyers‟s claims have been subjected 
to withering criticism.
18
  Here I will focus on just one 
                                                 
12 John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1049, 1066-67 (1994). 
13 Grisez, 2 The Way of the Lord Jesus at 633. 
14 Id. at 650. 
15 John M. Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual 
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 Am. J. 
Jurisprudence 97, 119 (1997). 
16 Id. at 123. 
17 Grisez, 2 The Way of the Lord Jesus, at 650-51. 
18 Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 Geo. L. 
J. 261 (1995); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A 
Response to John Finnis, 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 41, 
(1995); Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality, and Sexual 
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difficulty, the peculiar claim that the married couple 
become a single organism.  This is an odd claim in any 
case, but it becomes even odder when NNL insists that it is 
also true of an infertile heterosexual couple.  
Even when a heterosexual couple cannot reproduce, 
Finnis writes, the “union of the reproductive organs of 
husband and wife really unites them biologically (and their 
biological reality is part of, not merely an instrument of, 
their personal reality)”.19 Finnis explains that the 
infertile married couple 
who unite their reproductive organs in an act of 
sexual intercourse which, so far as they can make 
it, is of a kind suitable for generation, do 
function as a biological (and thus personal) unit 
and thus can be actualizing . . . the 
two-in-one-flesh common good and reality of 
marriage, even when some biological condition 
happens to prevent that unity resulting in 
generation of a child. Their conduct thus differs 
radically from the acts of a husband and wife 
whose intercourse is . . . sodomitic or by 
fellatio or coitus interruptus.
20
 
The radical difference here is difficult to discern. That 
sterile heterosexual coitus could have been procreative in 
some other possible world does not distinguish it from 
homosexual sex. 
 The NNL distinction turns on the form of the act, 
about which Lee and George write: 
People who are not temporarily or permanently 
infertile could procreate by performing exactly 
the same type of act which the infertile married 
couple perform and by which they consummate or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Complementarity, in Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and 
Nature 239-40 (David Estlund & Martha Nussbaum eds. 1997); Paul J. 
Weithman, A Propos of Professor Perry: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual 
Ethics, 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 75 (1995); Martha C. 
Nussbaum & Kenneth J. Dover, Dover and Nussbaum Reply to Finnis, in 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of 
Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 Virginia Law 
Review 1515, 1649 (1994); John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB 
Argument, 115 Ethics 501 (2005); Gareth Moore, Natural Sex: Germain 
Grisez, Sex, and Natural Law, in The Revival of Natural Law:  
Philosophical, Theological, and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez 
School (Nigel Biggar & Rufus Black 2000); Nigel Biggar, Conclusion, in 
The Revival of Natural Law; Nicholas Bamforth and David A. J. Richards, 
Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural 
Law (2007); and my works cited supra note 7. 
19 Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, at 1066. 
20 Id. at 1068. 
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actualize their marital communion. The difference 
between sterile and fertile married couples is 
not a difference in what they do. Rather it is a 
difference in a distinct condition which affects 
what may result from what they do.
21
 
I have stated my objection to this before.  The 
core difficulty is that the classification of marital 
acts, including the infertile heterosexual couple but 
excluding the homosexual couple, is arbitrary: 
What sense does it make to postulate one type of 
sexual activity as normative in this way, so that 
heterosexual intercourse is held to be an act of 
reproductive kind even if reproduction is not intended 
and is known to be impossible?  Why is it not equally 
plausible to say that all acts of seminal ejaculation 
are reproductive in kind, or to say that no acts of 
seminal ejaculation are reproductive in kind, and that 
reproduction is only an accidental consequence that 
may ensue under certain conditions?  There is nothing 
in nature that dictates that the lines have to be 
drawn in any of these ways.
22
 
An infertile reproductive organ remains taxonomically a 
reproductive organ, but if it is infertile, it is not a 
reproductive organ “in the sense of power or potential.”23  
It is not a reproductive organ in that sense.  “A sterile 
person‟s genitals are no more suitable for generation than 
an unloaded gun is suitable for shooting.  If someone 
points a gun at me and pulls the trigger, he exhibits the 
behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for shooting, but 
it still matters a lot whether the gun is loaded and 
whether he knows it.”24 
The new natural lawyers‟ recent work largely repeats 
their view rather than defending it against objections,
25
 
                                                 
21 Lee & George, What Sex Can Be, at 150. 
22 Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question, at 86-87. 
23 Id. at 88. 
24 Id. 
25 Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage:  Our Final Answer?, 14 Notre 
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 729 (2000); John Finnis, “An 
Intrinsically Disordered Inclination,” in Same-Sex Attraction:  A 
Parents‟ Guide 89 (John F. Harvey & Gerard V. Bradley eds. 2003); 
Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and Sexual Liberation:  Courts 
and the Abolition of Marriage, 17 Regent U. L. Rev. 21 (2004); Gerard 
V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 14 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics 
& Pub. Pol‟y 189 (2004); Patrick Lee, The Human Body and Sexuality in 
the Teaching of Pope John Paul II, in John Paul II‟s Contribution to 
Catholic Bioethics 107 (Christopher Tollefsen ed. 2004); John Finnis, 
Marriage:  A Basic and Exigent Good, 91 The Monist 388 (2008); Gerard 
V. Bradley, What‟s In a Name?  A Philosophical Critique of „Civil 
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but Lee and George have responded to me in some detail.
26
  
In response to the problem of the infertile couple, they 
write: 
But our claim is not that in a marital act, one must 
intend to procreate, hope to procreate, or even think 
that procreation is in these circumstances possible.  
Our claim is that a marital act is an act in which a 
man and woman, as complementary, become bodily and 
organically one, in that they jointly perform a single 
act, single in that it is an act that is biologically 
oriented to procreation, though some other condition 
in the agents may prevent the completion of that 
orientation in this act.
27
 
It is not clear what is doing the work here.  Perhaps it is 
the proposition that the couple “become bodily and 
organically one” because they are engaged in a reproductive 
type of act.  But they do not become a single organism even 
if they happen to conceive. 
Lee and George concede that “[n]ot every instance of 
two entities sharing in an action are instances of two 
entities becoming biologically one.”  The act of 
reproduction, however, 
can be actualized only in cooperation with the 
opposite sex of the species.  The reproductive bodily 
parts are internally oriented toward actuation 
together with the bodily parts of the opposite sex.  
So, although the bodily parts of the male and the 
female are not interdependent for their continued life 
(as the bodily parts are to each other in a male 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unions‟ Predicated Upon a Sexual Relationship, 91 The Monist 606 
(2008).  George and Bradley have also invoked these arguments to 
justify the criminalization of homosexual sex and a constitutional 
amendment against same-sex marriage.  Robert P. George, The Concept of 
Public Morality, 45 Am. J. Jurisprudence 17, 30-31 (2000); Robert P. 
George, One Man, One Woman:  The Case for Preserving the Definition of 
Marriage, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2003; Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and 
Fight:  Don‟t Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, National Rev., July 28, 
2003; Robert P. George, The 28th Amendment, National Rev., July 23, 
2001. 
26 Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary 
Ethics and Politics 191-93, 197-204 (2007); Robert P. George, What‟s 
Sex Got to Do With It?  Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, in The 
Meaning of Marriage:  Family, State, Market, and Morals 142 (Robert P. 
George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006); see also Patrick Lee, 
Marriage, Procreation, and Same-Sex Unions, 91 The Monist 422 (2008); 
Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Male-Female Complementarity Makes 
Possible:  Marriage as a Two-in-One-Flesh Union, 69 Theol. Stud. 641 
(2008)(responding to similar objections). 
27 Lee and George, Body-Self Dualism, at 204. 
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organism or the bodily parts to each other in a female 




The logic packed into the word “So” at the beginning of the 
final sentence is obscure.  In reproduction, two entities 
share in a bodily action.  That does not mean that they 
become one, even though the action they perform could not 
be performed by either of them individually.  Two pianists 
playing a four hands piece do not become biologically one, 
even though they are using parts of their bodies in a 
complementary way. 
 To defend his claim of organic unity, George cites a 
thought experiment proposed to him in conversation by 
Grisez: 
Imagine a type of bodily, rational being that 
reproduces, not by mating, but by some individual 
performance.  Imagine that for these beings, however, 
locomotion or digestion is performed not by 
individuals, but only by biologically complementary 
pairs that unite for this purpose.  Would anybody have 
difficulty understanding that in respect of 
reproduction the organism performing the function is 
the individual, while in respect of locomotion or 
digestion the organism performing the function is the 
united pair?  Would anybody deny that the unity 




The thought experiment does not lead where Grisez 
intends.  Let‟s suppose, to specify, that these beings have 
half the body of a human being, clumsily hopping about on a 
single leg, fulfilling the threat of Zeus in Aristophanes‟s 
speech from Plato‟s Symposium.30  In this fashion they can 
barely move at all by themselves (they keep falling on 
their one-eyed faces), while they can walk very efficiently 
if a left half and a right half grab each other‟s upper 
bodies tightly. 
Whey they walk, thus connected, certainly it is the 
united pair that is walking.  It does not follow that they 
are “an organic unity,” much less a single organism.  They 
are simply cooperating in a joint task.  Two organisms 
engaged in symbiotic cooperation remain two organisms.  In 
a lichen, the fungus and the algae do not become a single 
organism. 
                                                 
28 Id. at 183 n. 15.  
29 George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It? at 158-59. 
30 Plato, Symposium 190d. 
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Even if the couple does not become a single organism, 
George can still say that their coitus “is an act that is 
oriented to procreation.”  But it is obscure how an act can 
be oriented to procreation when procreation is known to be, 
not merely unlikely, but actually impossible.  If the two 
Aristophanean halves grabbed hold of each other and waved 
their legs while suspended in midair on a bungee, would 
their action be oriented to locomotion?  Could the 
locomotive character of their motion be a source of its 
goodness?  Would that goodness be absent if two left-sided 
half-people (who could not walk together) waved their legs 
together while hanging from the same bungee?  
George notes that coition is only one part of the 
reproductive process, and that as a part of the process, it 
can be completed by the infertile couple: 
In performing this first part of the reproductive 
process together, the male and the female act as a 
single unit, even where in many cases the second part 
of the process cannot (for any of a variety of causes) 
be completed. . . . A condition, or even a defect, 
which prevents the second part of the process cannot 
change the fact that the male and the female did 
actually unite – become organically one – in the first 
part of that process.  If conception does occur, it 
won‟t be until several hours later (at the earliest); 
and whether they now become one cannot depend on 
events that occur only later.
31
 
There is a deep confusion here.  My action can make 
sense as part of a process, can take its meaning from its 
role in facilitating that process, only if the process is 
known to be capable of completion.  This is true even if 
the success of the project is unlikely.  But it is not true 
if success is impossible. 
A surgeon trying to save the life of a gravely sick 
patient is engaged in the practice of medicine even if the 
patient‟s death is almost certain.  No guarantee of success 
is necessary.  (Little human endeavor comes with a 
guarantee of success.)  So long as the patient is alive and 
the surgery even marginally increases the likelihood of the 
patient‟s survival, then the surgeon‟s behavior makes 
perfect sense.  He is engaged in a medical-type act.  
Whether it is a medical-type act now cannot depend on 
events that occur only later, such as the patient‟s 
recovery.  
                                                 
31 George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It? at 162. 
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But what would we think if the surgeon performed 
exactly the same actions, involving the same bodily 
motions, when the patient is already dead?  George writes 
that 
the only behavior which the partners have direct 
control over is coition itself, performed in such a 
way as to fulfill the behavioral conditions of 
reproduction.  This is the only act, the only 
behavior, which they directly perform, and it disposes 
them to procreation (rather than being the direct act 
of procreating).  Thus, the other conditions (an 
adequate sperm count, time of ovulation, etc.) are not 




Try this logic on the surgeon as he operates on the corpse.  
All of George‟s verbal moves are available here, but the 
result will be pretty weird: 
The only behavior which the surgeon has direct control 
over is surgery itself, performed in such a way as to 
fulfill the behavioral conditions of the patient‟s 
recovery.  This is the only act, the only behavior, 
which he directly performs, and it disposes him to 
healing (rather than being the direct act of healing, 
which in every case of medicine may or may not 
happen).  Thus, the other conditions (a patient who is 
alive at the time of the surgery, etc.) are not part 
of the surgeon‟s behavior, not part of what he does. 
 George adds that “a second reason” why infertile 
spouses‟ marital acts “are reproductive in kind is that 
they bespeak and bear witness to the intrinsic goodness of 
marriage, the kind of community that is naturally fulfilled 
by the bearing and rearing of children.”33  But this is not 
a second reason at all.  It is the first reason restated.  
If the couple do not unite organically, if their actions 
aren‟t intelligible because of their relationship to 
reproduction, then there is no “intrinsic goodness of 
marriage,” in the sense in which he means these words, for 
their acts to bespeak and bear witness to. 
It is one of the facts about the human capacity for 
signification that anything can bespeak anything.  You can 
sprinkle the fairy dust anywhere you like:  you could 
attribute goodness only to the sex acts of Chicago White 
Sox fans who copulate on Tuesdays.  But the new natural 
lawyers have not identified a distinctive, intelligible 
                                                 
32 Id. at 163. 
33 Id. at 164-65. 
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category of action to which intrinsic goodness can be shown 
uniquely to attach. 
 
Geach‟s new strategy 
 
Geach does not rely on the claim that the married 
heterosexual couple unites biologically.
34
  She does, 
however, think that their coupling matters because of its 
relation to procreation.  Her central claims are that there 
is a distinctive sexual virtue for human beings, that this 
virtue marks the boundaries of permissible sexual conduct 
in the ways earlier enumerated, and that this is so 
for two related reasons:  firstly, because the sense 
of marriage as an integral whole is part of the 
psychic makeup of the virtuous man, a part which is 
damaged when we use our bodies in a way which treats 
this whole as a collection of separable parts, and 
secondly, because it belongs to the good order of 




She agrees with NNL that heterosexual marriage, defined as 
NNL defines it, is an ultimate, noninstrumental good.  Her 
claims about sexual virtue are parasitic on this ultimate 
value claim.  Her task, then, is to persuade the reader to 
see the distinctive human end that she sees. 
This presents a rhetorical challenge, for her as much 
as for NNL.  The basic problem, George observes, is that 
"intrinsic values, as ultimate reasons for action, cannot 
be deduced or inferred.  We do not, for example, infer the 
intrinsic goodness of health from the fact, if it is a 
fact, that people everywhere seem to desire it. . . . We 
see the point of acting for the sake of health, in 
ourselves or in others, just for its own sake, without the 
benefit of any such inference."
36
  If the value of health is 
defended as a means to some other end, then the question 
will arise why that is a good thing; the chain of reasoning 
has to conclude somewhere, with some good that is deemed 
good in itself and not as a means to something else.  The 
intrinsic nature of intrinsic goods can only be defended 
dialectically: 
                                                 
34 She offers formulations that approach this claim in Lying at 524 and 
548-49, but it is peripheral to her argument.  Unlike the NNL 
theorists, her argument would not be weakened if it were rejected. 
35 Geach, Lying, at 528.   
36 Robert P. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, in In 
Defense of Natural Law 48 (1999). 
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While they may be defended by dialectical 
arguments designed either to rebut arguments 
against them, or to show up the defects or 
inadequacies of ethical theories that attempt to 
do without them, they cannot themselves be 
deduced or inferred or derived from more 
fundamental premises.  One cannot argue one's way 
to them (the way one can, on the basis of more 
fundamental premises, argue one's way to a 
conclusion).  The claim that they are self-
evident does not imply that they are undeniable 
or, still less, that no one denies them.  What it 
does imply is that the practical intellect may 
grasp them, and practical judgment can affirm 
them without the need for a derivation.  (Which 
is not to say that they can be grasped without an 




Geach acknowledges the difficulty of 
demonstrating her core account of the virtue concerned 
with sex, a virtue that takes its character from both 
human nature and from the good that sexuality is 
directed toward.  “One can‟t prove the first 
principle, in the sense of demonstrating it as the 
logical consequence of some other principle.”38  
Instead, she proposes to follow a procedure common in 
natural science:  to “form an hypothesis which covers 
the facts, and then see whether things do happen in 
accordance with this hypothesis.”39  The evidence that 
supports her hypothesis is “[t]he benefits of 
marriage” and, more importantly (since most supporters 
of gay rights do not deny that heterosexual marriage 
has benefits), “the ills resulting from disordered 
sexuality.”40 
To begin with, there is the importance, for any human 
civilization, of an ethic of chastity, especially among 
                                                 
37 Id. at 45.   
38 Geach, Lying, at 529.  As she puts it elsewhere:  “I don‟t think we 
can deduce the need for marriage from first principles about life and 
friendship:  we have to include among the first principles of morality 
not just the need to pursue these basic goods, but also the existence 
of marriage, the capacity for which is itself a part of the fabric and 
constitution of our nature.”  Mary Geach, Marriage:  Arguing to a First 
Principle in Sexual Ethics, in Moral Truth and Moral Tradition:  Essays 
in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe 177, 181 (Luke Gormally 
ed. 1994). 
39 Geach, Lying, at 540. 
40 Id. at 540. 
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women.  In all of the world‟s great civilizations, “the 
chastity of women is highly valued, and there is also some 
idea of a corresponding virtue of men.”41  Female chastity 
is important so men can know who their children are, and 
only men who know that will do the hard work of supporting 
women and children.  Fathers also have “the strength and 
will to control [children] and teach them respect for 
authority and for law. . . . If the men laze around leaving 
everything to the women, and if the women whore around so 
that no one knows who his father is, then everything will 
decay, and the people will no longer respect duly 
constituted authority and laws but will rather be ruled by 
servile fear or inarticulate adherence to custom.”42  
Civilization requires, then, that “the virtuous of both 
sexes have a profound state of mind inclining them to 
faithfulness in marriage.”43  All of these facts point to 
the truth of the good of marriage as Geach conceives it.  
That good “stands to our sexual actions in a relation 
similar to that in which the truth conditions of a 
proposition stand to the assertion of it.”44  Orientation 
toward marriage as she understands it explains the state of 
mind necessary for marital chastity.  It also explains and 
provides a justification for sexual jealousy,
45
 it explains 
the importance of consent to sex,
46
 it explains why lovers 
yearn for a permanent union.
47
 
Pleasure, on the other hand, is “an aspect, but not an 
end,”48 of the marriage act.  When it is disconnected from 
any good of which it could be a part, pleasure is not in 
itself good.  “If someone has such sensations in connection 
with the pain suffered by others, should we say that, 
though the pain was bad, his erotic sensations were good?  
Or that his delight in these sensations was good?  Surely 
not.”49  Rather, these sensations are “about something, and 
what they are about should be appropriate, which we realize 
                                                 
41 Id. at 534. 
42 Id. at 535.  I note in passing the strangeness of the implication 
that mothers cannot teach children respect for authority. 
43 Id. at 536. 
44 Id. at 544. 
45 Id. at 537. 
46 Id. at 537-38. 
47 Id. at 539. 
48
  Id. at 547. 
49 Id.  The example does not prove that pleasure is not in itself good, 
but only that it is sometimes inextricably joined with something that 
is very bad.  Any good thing that is abused by its possessor is a fit 
occasion for ambivalence.  It would have been better if Hitler had been 
less clever and resourceful than he was, but intelligence is 
nonetheless in itself good. 
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when we consider how stupid and mad our sexuality can make 
us.”50 
 
Miracle, mystery, and authority:  Wax  
 
All this evidence about the value of the old sexual 
ethic, even if it is accepted (I will offer some cautions 
below), doesn‟t get Geach to the conclusion she is after.  
It is consistent with the view, which she rejects, that 
there is no genuine moral requirement of chastity to which 
this ethic responds. 
It might be that the norm of chastity, as she 
conceives it, is a socially useful illusion.  This is how 
Friedrich Hayek thought about religious belief.  Hayek 
thought that the persistence of customs conducive to social 
cooperation was closely tied to the support those customs 
received from religion.  Of course, not all religions had 
this beneficent effect.  “Among the founders of religions 
over the last two thousand years, many opposed property and 
the family.  But the only religions that have survived are 
those which support property and the family.”51  The process 
by which the pertinent selection occurred may have been 
invisible to those who benefited from it.  “Customs whose 
beneficial effects were unperceivable by those practicing 
them were likely to be preserved long enough to increase 
their selective advantage only when supported by some other 
strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or magic 
faiths were readily available to perform this role.”52  What 
matters is that the customs that survived were the ones 
that “influence[ed] men to do what was required to maintain 
the structure enabling them to nourish their enlarging 
numbers.”53  The value of religion, for Hayek, is that it 
enables people to engage, “peacefully though competitively, 
in pursuing thousands of different ends of their own 
choosing in collaboration with thousands of persons whom 
they will never know.”54  Hayek himself was an atheist who 
regarded the notion of God as unintelligible;
55
 he regarded 
religion as a functionally valuable fiction.  For Hayek, 
cooperation-inducing rules need not be adopted for that 
                                                 
50 Geach, Lying, at 547. 
51 1 The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek:  The Fatal Conceit:  The Errors 
of Socialism 137 (W.W. Bartley III ed. 1988). 
52 Id. at 138. 
53 Id.  The evolutionary argument is further developed in Friedrich A. 
Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation, and Liberty:  The Mirage of Social Justice 
17-23 (1976). 
54 Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, at 135. 
55 See id. at 139-40. 
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purpose:  “Neither the groups who first practised these 
rules, nor those who imitated them, need ever have known 
why their conduct was more successful than that of others, 
or helped the group persist.”56 
Something like Hayek‟s view is evident in the 
objections to same-sex marriage developed by Amy Wax.
57
  
Wax‟s claims are not the same as Geach‟s, because she 
focuses solely on same-sex marriage and does not claim that 
homosexual sex is per se immoral.  Her concern is public 
mythos, not private conduct. 
Wax worries that recognition of same-sex marriage 
could weaken or transform the conventions surrounding 
heterosexual marriages: 
The fear is that, if the institution of marriage is 
reshaped to give priority to diversity, choice, and 
individual prerogatives--and if marital roles are 
redefined to fit different homosexual and heterosexual 
lifestyles--then behavior surrounding all marital 
relations may change in response. Those changes may 
not be beneficial. For example, if homosexuals are 
less likely to have children, procreation might become 
less central to marriage. This might foster a model of 
marriage that views children as optional or even 
unimportant. Or, in keeping with past commitments and 
rhetoric, homosexual couples might place less emphasis 
on sexual fidelity or be more tolerant of sexual 
infidelity within their relationships. The existence 
of a significant number of “open marriage” homosexual 
couples might affect how heterosexuals view their own 




At no point does Wax suggest that the sexual lives of 
gay people are per se inferior to those of heterosexuals, 
or in any way immoral.  She is simply concerned about the 
                                                 
56 Id. at 21. 
57 Wax distinguishes her view from Hayek‟s at one point, but she is 
focusing on his libertarianism, not on his endorsement of religious 
mystification.  Amy L. Wax, The Conservative‟s Dilemma:  Traditional 
Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 San Diego L. 
Rev. 1059, 1065 n.16 (2005).   
This conservative caution about changing family forms obviously 
has ramifications beyond marriage.  Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson once 
suggested that the protection of traditional family patterns might 
justify the criminalization of homosexual sex.  J. Harvie Wilkinson III 
& G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 
62 Cornell L.Rev. 563, 596 (1977). 
58 Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 
Rutgers L. Rev. 377, 400-01 (2007)(footnote omitted). 
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effect of their acceptance on the broader social ecology.  
It‟s really the heterosexuals that she‟s worried about.  
The old sexual scripts are a solution to their perennial 
problems, most prominently the difficulty of forging bonds 
between fathers and children. 
Because most people are incapable of reasoning through 
every dilemma of social life on their own, they depend 
on off-the-shelf scripts that define basic duties and 
provide transparent guidelines for behavior in 
commonplace social situations. Simple, unyielding 
rules maximize the chance that persons of limited 
intellect and self-control will negotiate complex 
human interactions successfully. As such, these 
scripts should be as clear and unequivocal as 
possible. Formal institutions such as marriage, by 
embodying a simple and transparent set of 




Wax values these off-the-shelf scripts for the same reason 
as Hayek.  It is an unhappy fact of social life that most 
people depend on miracle, mystery, and authority. 
 For the most part, Wax‟s focus is not on gay people, 
but on the feared effects of legitimizing homosexuality on 
the wider, heterosexual population.  However, she does 
raise concerns about gay people raising children (which 
will happen more often if gays marry).  She cites studies 
showing that children thrive better when raised by their 
married biological parents than by other combinations, such 
as “[c]hildren in single parent families, children born to 
unmarried mothers, and children in step-families or 
cohabiting relationships.”60  These concerns do not 
necessarily bar recognition of same-sex marriage:  
“enhanced risks for children, especially if modest, may not 
warrant abandoning reforms motivated by a firm commitment 
to rights and equality.”61 
These studies, without more, can‟t provide even mild 
support for the case against same-sex marriage.  Same-sex 
couples are already raising large numbers of children, and 
will continue to do so whether or not same-sex marriage is 
                                                 
59 Wax, The Conservative‟s Dilemma, at 1090. 
60 Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, at 402, quoting Kristin Anderson 
Moore, et a1., Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does Family 
Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do About It?, Child Trends 
Research Brief 6 (Jun. 2002). A similar argument is made by Maggie 
Gallagher, whose argument is critiqued in Koppelman, Decline and Fall. 




  Withholding recognition just makes these 
children‟s lives less stable.  Moreover, whatever the 
deficits of the kinds of households listed, there is no 
evidence that children raised by same-sex couples do worse 
than children raised by heterosexual couples.
63
  The 
household types are too different to support any inference 
from one to the other.  In households with stepfathers, for 
example, the introduction of a new adult into the household 
is yet another disruption in children‟s lives; stepfathers 
are less likely to be committed to the child‟s welfare and 
less likely to be a check on the mother‟s behavior; they 
sometimes compete with the child for the mother‟s time; the 
mother may be reluctant to share authority with the 
stepfather.
64
  None of these problems are likely to be 
present in children of same-sex couples.  Wax worries that 
those children are likely to face other, analogous 
problems.  But if this were true, would there not be some 
evidence of it? 
Her conclusion, on the basis of this evidence, that 
the heterosexual nuclear family is the “gold standard” for 
family form,
65
 and that “[c]hildren do best if their entire 
childhood is spent with both their biological parents,”66 is 
like saying that, given that a poodle is bigger than a 
squirrel or a butterfly, it follows that the poodle is 
bigger than any other animal.   
 
To Hell in a Handbasket, and Back 
 
                                                 
62 The 2000 Census found that nearly 600,000 same-sex couples reported 
themselves as “unmarried partners,” compared with 145,130 such 
households counted by the 1990 Census.  The number is probably a 
substantial undercount, since many gay people are unwilling to share 
this information with the government.  Same-sex households were 
reported in 99.3% of U.S. counties in 2000, and were about as racially 
diverse as the population as a whole.  Children were present in 34% of 
lesbian couples and 22% of gay male couples.  (By comparison, 46% of 
married heterosexual couples were raising children.)  Sean Cahill, 
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States:  Focus on the Facts 43-46 
(2004). 
63 See Abbie E. Goldberg, Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children:  
Research on the Family Life Cycle (2010); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. 
Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 Am. 
Soc. Rev. 159 (2001). 
64 Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up With a Single Parent:  
What Hurts, What Helps 29 (1994).  This book is cited in Wax, The 
Conservative‟s Dilemma, at 1087 n.79.  She acknowledges these specific 
issues in Traditionalism, Pluralism, at 409. 
65 Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, at 407. 
66 Id. at 409. 
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 Geach, on the other hand, thinks that homosexuality is 
immoral regardless of its social effects.  Even private 
homosexual conduct that no one else ever knows about is 
immoral. 
Geach‟s claim would be stronger if it could be shown, 
not merely that the ethic she describes is useful for some 
societies, but that human society cannot flourish without 
it.  If a sexual ethic is merely a noble lie, then people 
can dispense with it if they are able to consciously and 
directly pursue the purpose that the noble lie serves.  
Hayek thought that religion inadvertently served the cause 
of economic growth, but his own philosophy aimed at growth 
without relying on what he regarded as childish 
mystifications, and he has many followers.  If, on the 
other hand, it turns out that those who turn away from the 
ancient ways inevitably come to wreck, this would be 
evidence that those ways are, indeed, part of the fabric of 
human nature. 
So Geach moves on, to enumerate the pathologies 
produced by our present civilization‟s relaxed sexual 
mores.
67
  The relaxed attitude toward masturbation and 
sexual fantasy is destructive, because orgasmic fantasy 
“seriously undermines one‟s sense of reality, and damages 
one‟s ability to empathise with other people, because the 
use of one‟s sexuality signifies another party, and one has 
been using it when no other party was present.”68  This 
“explains the nastiness of some adolescents, and of some 
single people.”69  The absence of clear conventions about 
the limits of what unmarried men may do generates the 
problem of date rape.
70
  The acceptance of homosexuality 
damages all relations between persons of the same sex, by 
making non-sexual friendship harder than it once was 
because it is now tainted by sexual fear and avoidance.
71
  
                                                 
67 The new natural law theorists often help themselves to this kind of 
claim; see, e.g., Finnis, Marriage:  A Basic and Exigent Good, at 402, 
Lee, Marriage, Procreation, and Same-Sex Unions at 432, George, What‟s 
Sex Got to Do With It? at 147-49; but it is peripheral to their 
argument, which does not depend on the existence of any such 
pathologies. 
68 Geach, Lying, at 539. 
69 Id. at 540. 
70 Id. at 537-38. 
71 Id. at 532.  Her points about homosexuality are not strictly speaking 
part of her argument, as she states them before making the case for her 
first principle, and writes that in making that case she will “leave 
sodomy to one side.”  Id. at 531.  Nonetheless, her allegations about 
homosexuality, if accepted, do strengthen her case that modern sexual 
mores are pathological, so they must be rebutted if her claims are to 
be answered. 
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The acceptance of homosexuality tends to place society on a 
path of “decay to the point where there is no separate 
class of homosexuals, but one undifferentiated lustful 
multitude.”72  Most alarmingly, “where there is a widespread 
abuse of human sexuality, life will come to seem 
meaningless and many will commit suicide.”73  And, in fact, 
“in our comfortable and apparently happy society . . . 
suicide happens a great deal.”74   Our society “is in a 
state of decadence, and with its aging population and 
weapons of mass destruction seems to be heading towards its 
end.”75  These are categorical claims about the destructive 
effects of sexual vice on human nature.  No Hayekian elite 
could evade its malign power. 
Geach despises cruelty and self-deception, and cares 
urgently about the future of civilization.  Her humane 
impulses are admirable.  But one must have a heart of stone 
to read her catalogue of horrors without laughing.  Her 
theories about the catastrophic effects of masturbation are 
only the latest of a long series of delusions about the 
practice, all focusing (as she does) on the fear that young 
people would withdraw entirely from society, pursuing 
pleasures that were asocial and autarkic.
76
  Just how much 
special discernment does it really take to avoid raping 
your date?  I can‟t think of a single instance in which 
I‟ve experienced the hesitation with my friends (including 
my gay friends) that Geach frets about.  As the sexual 
revolution has unfolded in the United States and England, 
the suicide rate has been steadily declining.
77
   
 
The new middle class ethic 
 
                                                 
72 Id. at 533. 
73 Id. at 544. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 556 n.17. 
76 See THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX:  A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION (2003); 
WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM:  PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 138–43 (1988); 
HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX:  BATTLES OVER SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION 
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 92–93, 97–107, 394–403 (2003).   
77 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Health, United States, 2008, at 258-60, Table 
45, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf (visited 
July 22, 2009); National Mental Health Development Unit, National 
Suicide Prevention Strategy for England, Annual Report on Progress 
2008, at 13-14 (“The suicide rate for the year 2007, the most recent 
available, was the lowest recorded.”), available at 
http://www.nmhdu.org.uk/silo/files/national-suicide-prevention-
strategy-for-england--annual-report-on-progress-2008.pdf (visited July 
22, 2009). 
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Geach and Wax are right to ask about the costs of 
relaxing the old rules.  As noted earlier, Wax has plenty 
of data that show that children tend to do best when raised 
by their biological parents, and that single motherhood is 
especially hard on children.  Both of them are right that 
it would be a mistake to discard the old ethic and replace 
it with an ethic of individual self-fulfillment, leaving 
men free to scatter their seed at will. 
Society needs an ethic that binds fathers to children.  
But there is more than one candidate for that job.  The 
story of the modern sexual revolution is not merely the 
story of the decay of the old ways.  It has also seen the 
emergence of a new ethic, one that in many ways produces 
stronger, more functional families that serve children‟s 
needs better than the old model. 
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone observe that two different 
family systems, presupposing different norms, now exist in 
the United States.  The older, more traditional model 
encourages marriage relatively soon after (if not 
before) the beginning of sexual activity, identifies 
responsible childbearing with family form rather than 
economic self-sufficiency or emotional maturity, and 
embraces more authoritarian models of parenting and 
the state -- both should be able and willing to 
intervene to promote the “right” moral values. . . . 
{A]bstinence outside of marriage is a moral 
imperative, the shotgun marriage is the preferred 
solution to an improvident pregnancy, and 
socialization into traditional gender roles is 
critical to marital stability.  Abortion is an 
abomination not only because it violates religious 
teachings about the beginning of life, but also 
because it represents a determination to evade the 
consequences of immoral conduct. And gay marriage is, 
if anything, worse than abortion – the symbol of at 




This model remains prevalent in much of the United States.  
But it has costs.  Where it prevails, divorce rates are the 
highest in the country, because early marriages are the 
most likely to fail.  Teen pregnancy and single motherhood 
are frequent.  The problem is that, although this ethic has 
considerable continuing power, it is in decay.  Its 
enforcement mechanisms have weakened.  Unhappy couples can 
                                                 
78 Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, George 
Washington Law School Working Paper, Aug. 16, 2007, at 3, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008544.  
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no longer be forced to stay together, and teenagers can‟t 
be prevented from having sex. 
 At the same time, a new sexual ethic has emerged.  
This newer model, which Cahn and Carbone call the “new 
middle class ethic,” 
involves less control of sexuality, celebrates more 
egalitarian gender roles, and promotes financial 
independence and emotional maturity as the sine qua 
non of responsible parenthood. The hallmarks of the 
new system‟s success are lower rates of divorce and 
teen births; its weaknesses may ultimately be falling 
fertility and high percentages of the population 
living alone. In this new model, abstinence is 
unrealistic, contraception is not only permissible, 




Delayed childbearing facilitates more education, which in 
turn leads to higher incomes later in life.  The newer 
model is no less functional than the old one.  Indeed, from 
the standpoint of child welfare, it has obvious advantages, 
since it produces less divorce and more mature parenting. 
The new model is most prevalent among the most 
educated classes, who have the highest incomes.  The 
differences are starkly revealed in patterns of single 
childbearing.  In 1960, about 14% of mothers in the bottom 
education quartile were single, compared with 4.5% of 
mothers in the top quartile.  By 2000, the respective 
percentages were 43% and 7%.  College-educated women are 
more likely to marry than other women, and less likely to 
divorce.  The disparity appears to have much to do with 
delayed childbearing by educated women, which in turn is 
the result of contraception and abortion.
80
  
Integral to this model is greater tolerance of 
homosexuality.  Since this model separates sex from 
reproduction and values recreational sex, it is not 
particularly threatened by sex that manifestly has nothing 
to do with procreation.  Tolerance for homosexuality 
                                                 
79 Id. at 2.  Cahn and Carbone identify these two models with the states 
that voted Democratic or Republican in the 2004 election, which they 
acknowledge is an oversimplification.  Both models have some cultural 
power, and influence the shape of family law, in every state in the 
country. 
80 Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies:  How Children are Faring Under 
the Second Demographic Transition, 41 Demography 607 (2004); see also 
David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-
Parent Families:  What Do We Know?  Where Do We Look for Answers?, in 
Social Inequality 3 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed. 2004). 
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The greater stability of these high-income families is 
directly related to their abandonment of the ethic that 
Geach and Wax are hoping to preserve.  Their children do 
better because the parents have separated sex from 
reproduction.  Support for gay rights will not corrode 
these families.  Many of them already support gay rights, 
and they are doing fine.
82
 
Wax thinks that “[f]amily disintegration is almost 
surely the product of a multi-pronged assault on 
conventional strictures and understandings from many 
quarters, with factors like the availability of birth 
control, changes in divorce laws, feminism, the sexual 
revolution, and the courts' recognition of children's and 
parental rights outside of marriage playing some role.”83  
The phenomena she describes are, however, equally present 
in the top-quartile and bottom-quartile families, and 
cannot explain the differences between them.  In fact, the 
upper-income families have replicated the statistics of 40 
years ago, and in some respects their children are doing 
even better:  their households are more prosperous, and 
they spend more time with their fathers.
84
   
The poorest Americans do have a tendency (only a 
tendency; more than half of bottom-quartile mothers are 
married) to exhibit precisely the kind of sexual ethic that 
Geach fears, with the disastrous consequences that she 
predicts.  Men casually impregnate women.  The women raise 
the children with difficulty.  The men are disconnected 
from the next generation.  The children, especially the 
boys, are poorly socialized.  The pattern repeats from one 
generation to the next. 
                                                 
81 A 2003 study by the Pew Research Center found that 44% of college 
graduates, but only 23% of high school dropouts, supported same-sex 
marriage; 40% of those with incomes above $75,000, but only 32% of 
those making less than $20,000, had that view.  Pew Research Center For 
The People & The Press, Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to 
Homosexuality (Nov. 18, 2003), at 21. 
82 On the basis of a model much like Wax‟s, some scholars have claimed 
that recognition of same-sex marriage in some jurisdictions has led to 
the decline of heterosexual marriage in those jurisdictions.  Those 
claims have not withstood examination.  See M. V. Lee Badgett, When Gay 
People Get Married:  What Happens When Societies Legalize Same-Sex 
Marriage (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren R. Spedale, Gay 
Marriage: for Better or for Worse?: What We've Learned from the 
Evidence (2006). 
83 The Conservative‟s Dilemma at 1086. 
84 McLanahan at 608. 
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The causes of these patterns are not well understood.  
One survey concludes that the most widely cited papers are 
“those that disprove a popular explanation, not those that 
support one.”85 
What does appear clear is that the greater prevalence 
of unmarried motherhood among the poor is caused, in part 
(no one knows how large a part), by the vestiges of the old 
ethic, which has decayed unevenly.  Prohibitions that were 
functional in context have become pernicious in new 
circumstances.  The stigma of using birth control has, for 
some populations, decayed more slowly than the stigma of 
premarital sex:  sex is something unexpected that happens 
to you, while contraception identifies you as a bad girl 
who plans for sex.
86
  The stigma of unwed motherhood is 
sometimes felt less strongly than the stigma of divorce.
87
   
The unavailability of contraception to low-income women 
also increases the likelihood of pregnancy,
88
 and 
abstinence-focused sex education increases the likelihood 
that a girl will not even know how to contracept when she 
has her first sexual experience.
89
 
Among the poorest Americans, there is a third sexual 
ethic, which is more tolerant of childbearing outside of 
marriage than either of the other two.  (This is less 
distinctively an ethic than the other two, since it is not 
so much a norm of childbearing as a pattern of response to 
births that are often unplanned and unwelcome.  What 
matters here is that it cannot be conflated with either of 
the other two.
90
)  It is not, however, Geach‟s nightmare of 
a world in which people feel contempt for marriage.   
Poor Americans have the same high expectations for a 
marriage partner and an ideal marital relationship that 
rich Americans do.  They do not, however, regard marriage 
as a prerequisite for childbearing, and they think that 
having a child together is not a sufficient reason to 
                                                 
85 Ellwood & Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families, at 3. 
86 Kristin Luker, Taking Chances:  Abortion and the Decision Not to 
Contracept (1975). 
87 Kathryn Edin & Joanna M. Reed, Why Don‟t They Just Get Married?  
Barriers to Marriage among the Disadvantaged, 15 The Future of Children 
117 (2005).  One low-income mother declared, “I don‟t believe in 
divorce.  That‟s why none of the women in my family are married!”  Id. 
at 125. 
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 J.J. Frost et al., Improving Contraceptive Use in the United States, 
Guttmacher Institute:  In Brief (2008), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/05/09/ImprovingContraceptiveUse.pdf 
(visited Nov. 23, 2009). 
89 See John Santelli et al., Abstinence and abstinence-only education: a 
review of US policies and programs, 38 J. Adolescent Health 72 (2006). 
90 Thanks to June Carbone for helpful conversation on this point. 
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marry.  Nor is cohabitation:  one large study of children 
of urban unmarried parents found that 83 percent of out-of-
wedlock births to adult women were to romantically involved 
couples, about half of which were living together when the 
child was born.
91
  Rather, they tend to think that marriage 
should be reserved for couples who can afford a mortgage on 
a home, a car, some savings, and money to pay for a 
wedding.  Couples who eventually meet these economic goals 
do tend to marry once they have done so.   
The low marriage rate is in part a product of 
circumstances.
92
  The poor marry at a lower rate because 
most are unable to meet this higher standard.  If they 
could meet it, the standard would do less damage.  A 
substantial obstacle is many low-income men‟s unstable 
employment, low educational attainment, drug use, violence, 
and frequent encounters with the criminal justice system.
93
  
That, in turn, is the product of soft employment markets, 
bad schools, and drug laws that send huge number of young 
men to prison without significantly controlling drug 
markets.  Poor women‟s sexual behavior is in many ways a 
rational response to these circumstances.  College 
education is out of the question for many, and they 
perceive no reason to delay childbearing.  Since life 
expectancy is short, there are also substantial costs to 
delay. 
A different ethic about sex might help some of these 
these people.  Either of the two other American models 
would be an improvement.  Under the old model, they would 
abstain from sex until they are married, and they would 
delay marriage until their early twenties.  Under the new 
middle-class model, they would be sexually active during 
those years, but would carefully use contraception.  Which 




                                                 
91 Id. at 120. 
92 And nothing I write here should be construed to support the 
preposterous but widespread canard that if only these people changed 
their sexual behavior, they would stop being poor.  For description and 
critique, see Michael Brown et al., Whitewashing Race:  The Myth of a 
Color-Blind Society 66-103 (2003); Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black 
Body:  Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty 202-45 (1997). 
93 See generally id. 
94 Geach, of course, can‟t seriously consider the new model as a 
solution, since she thinks that premarital sex, contraception, and 
abortion are categorically immoral.  Many Americans agree with her 
about sex and abortion, but not about contraception.  About 40% think 
that sex outside of marriage is morally wrong; see 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/Marriage.aspx (visited July 29, 
2009); and 51% of Americans describe themselves as “pro-life,” though 
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Wax is well aware of the class divergence in 
childbearing patterns that I have described here.  She 
describes it herself, in an article that is not explicitly 
about same-sex marriage, but which concludes with the claim 
that these patterns are “reason to question our enthusiasm 
for innovative family forms and to support the revival of 
marriage and traditional family structures.”95  Her own data 
indicate, however, that it is precisely the more innovative 
family form – the “new middle class ethic,” which needs no 
revival - that is most successfully looking after 
children‟s needs in contemporary America.  Her caution that 
we should focus on “what actually works in practice to help 
shape human choice and nurture the most desirable human 
relationships”96 is pertinent here. 
The new middle-class ethic, to the extent that it is 
tolerant of same-sex unions, is a departure from the core, 
traditional purposes of marriage.  Maggie Gallagher, who 
opposes same-sex marriage for reasons much like Wax‟s, 
correctly observes that marriage came into existence, and 
primarily continues to function, “to manage the procreative 
consequences of sexual attraction between men and women.”97  
Same-sex marriage (absent children, although in fact 
children are often present) does not directly serve that 
function.  But the real question is whether the goods that 
have traditionally been realized (when all went well) in 
that practice can also be realized in other social units 
that don‟t correspond to the traditional definition.98 
                                                                                                                                                 
only 44% think that abortion should be legal in few or no 
circumstances.  Lydia Saad, More Americans “Pro-Life” Than “Pro-Choice” 
for First Time, May 15, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/More-
Americans-Pro-Life-Than-Pro-Choice-First-Time.aspx (visited Nov. 20, 
2009).  On the other hand, birth control is supported by 93 percent of 
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available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=608 (visited 
July 29, 2009).  Even American Catholic priests increasingly reject the 
sexual ethic that Geach propounds with respect to premarital sex, 
homosexual sex, and contraception.  See Andrew Greeley, The Catholic 
Revolution:  New Wine, Old Wineskins, and the Second Vatican Council 
124 (2004) 
95 Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality:  Class, Race, and Family 
Structure, 41 Fam. L. Q. 567, 599 (2007). 
96 Wax, The Conservative‟s Dilemma, at 1079. 
97 Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social 
Institution:  A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 33, 
47 (2004). 
98 Gallagher writes that “[s]ame-sex marriage will affect marriage by 
changing our core legal understanding of what marriage is. Marriage 
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We wouldn‟t have the institution of marriage without 
procreation.  But what‟s wrong with using an institution 
for unanticipated purposes?  The authors of the federal 
Constitution, many of whom owned slaves, did not intend the 
use of federal power to abolish slavery.  The builders of 
the Parthenon did not intend that it be maintained as an 
attraction for tourists and scholars.  Saddam Hussein did 
not intend that his presidential palaces be used to house a 
democratically elected government.  When a novel use of an 
inherited institution is proposed, the question ought to be 
whether that use is a good one, not whether it is 
consistent with the institution‟s original purpose. 
 My real disagreement with Wax has to do with the 
importance of miracle, mystery, and authority.  The old 
ethic did its job for a long time.  But to say that 
children can‟t thrive without the old sexual morality 
because they need to be connected with their fathers is 
like saying that animals can‟t live on land because they 
need gills to breathe.  I‟m not persuaded that people have 
to be fooled into being good parents.  I repeat what I said 
before:  I have three kids, and I don‟t think I stick 
around because I‟m mystified or confused.99    
 The basic Burkean point, that ancient rules probably 
have a rational basis or they wouldn‟t have survived so 
                                                                                                                                                 
will be a unisex relationship, unconnected to sex, babies or family 
structure.”  Maggie Gallagher, Maggie‟s Reply to Andrew Koppelman on 
Marriage and Same-Sex Marriage, Oct. 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.marriagedebate.com/mdblog/2005_10_02_mdblog_archive.htm.   
Here‟s a nice test of whether marriage, disconnected to reproduction, 
will have that consequence.  Arizona and Wisconsin have statutes that 
allow first cousins to marry only if they can‟t procreate.  (Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. 25-101(B); Wisc. Stat. Ann. 765.03.)  How alarmed ought we to be 
about these laws?  Do they install “a new definition of marriage, one 
disconnected from its historic meaning, purpose and function”?  Id.  Is 
this “going to make it much harder for parents and faith communities to 
promote the understanding that marriage is about generativity: 
connecting mothers and fathers to the children they make”?  Id. 
99 Koppelman, Decline and Fall, at 30.  To this Maggie Gallagher 
responds:  “This is a soundbite, not a serious thought.  It amounts to 
a rejection of the idea that the social meanings encoded in law matter.  
The law interacts only by directly punishing or directly benefiting 
free and disparate individuals.  The law is an administrator alone.  
Its ideas do not have any consequences.”  (How) Will Gay Marriage 
Weaken at 58.  Hardly.  I once wrote a whole book, Antidiscrimination 
Law and Social Equality (1996), arguing that the shaping of social 
meaning is a legitimate undertaking for the law.  See also Andrew 
Koppelman, On the Moral Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 Maryland 
L. Rev. 777 (2001).  What I doubt is that same-sex marriage will have 
the specific social meaning Gallagher claims it will:  an invitation 
for men to desert their wives and children.  I doubt that any father on 
the planet will interpret it that way. 
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long, is sound.  But conditions change.  Compare the 
prohibition of usury.  In the primitive agrarian societies 
of Biblical times, a loan was likely to be a response to 
unexpected disaster, and the ban on charging interest was a 
way of preventing people from exploiting others‟ 
misfortunes.  As modern commercial conditions changed, and 
finance became an unavoidable prerequisite of business, 
casuists quickly figured out that conditions had changed 
and so the old rules had to be modified.
100
  
There is a moral anchor amid this historical 
contingency:  the idea that people have value, that their 
needs should be looked after, and that it‟s wrong to regard 
another person as merely a source of economic gain.  With 
sex as with lending, people shouldn‟t stand toward one 
another in the relation of predator and prey.
101
 
 The old rules of sex are valuable because they cope 
with the problem of unintended pregnancy, which hasn‟t gone 
away.  But the old rules turn out to have costs.  Most 
obviously, people want to be happy, and the ban on divorce 
is a problem for that.
102
  The ban on contraception never 
made a lot of sense, absent condemnation of pleasure in 
sex.  And, of course, the cost to gay people of the 
traditional sexual ethic was extremely high.  So a more 
flexible set of rules have developed:  premarital sex is 
fine as long as contraception is carefully used; there‟s a 
strong presumption against adultery (though some married 
couples have tolerated it, and some even testify that 
tolerating it has helped hold their marriages together).  A 
                                                 
100 Albert R. Johnson & Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry:  A 
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central task of modern sexual ethics is to figure out what 
is living and what is dead in the old rules about sex, and 
where the lines are now to be drawn.
103
  The eminently 
responsible parental behavior of the people who have most 
firmly embraced the new ethic suggests that that ethic is 
less dangerous than Geach and Wax fear. 
Geach observes that I have not attempted to offer “an 
account of sexual virtue in general.”104  The emergence of 
the new middle class ethic suggests that there is no such 
thing as a single sexual virtue for all human beings.  The 
ethic that demands premarital chastity, above all of women, 
evidently is not indispensable in all societies.   
This is not the place to answer Geach‟s challenge, but 
I can say a few things about sexual virtue as I understand 
it.  Begin with the noncontroversial, though perhaps 
trivial, premise that virtue is a disposition to choose 
well.  Sexual virtue is a disposition to make good choices 
about sex.  This has negative and positive implications.  
Begin with the negative.   
Sex is, in characteristic ways, a frequent occasion 
for mistreatment of human beings:  physical and emotional 
abuse, manipulation and deception, the reckless spread of 
disease, and the irresponsible begetting of children.  
Since one should not mistreat people, a fortiori one should 
not mistreat them in this sphere.  The old and new sexual 
ethics converge here, though they disagree about the best 
strategy for avoiding such mistreatment.   
There is also the question of the positive goal toward 
which choice should aspire.  The fundamental disagreement 
between the old and new sexual ethics is here.  I have 
already stated why I am not persuaded by the account of 
that telos offered by NNL and Geach.  Can I offer anything 
better? 
I agree that the goodness of sex at its best has to do 
with its character as a certain kind of interpersonal 
communion.  “Conversation,” Geach observes, “is delightful 
because it is good to share thoughts in this way, and a 
part of friendship (not just a means to friendship but a 
part of what is constitutive of it) and we take pleasure, 
                                                 
103 There are a lot of people working on this, of course.  One of my 
favorites is the advice columnist Dan Savage, who delicately tries to 
work out an appropriate etiquette for group sex, bondage, fetishism, 
and other unusual tastes.  The need to treat other people decently and 
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 Lying, at 552. 
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we delight in, what we find good.”105  Sex at its best is 
something like conversation.  It is not something you can 
do by yourself.  It is essentially interaction with another 
person, an interaction in which you love and value me in my 
wholeness, as body and mind and infantile neediness, and I 
love and value you in the same way.  When I am the object 
of lust, this sometimes means that I am appreciated in the 
full embodied particularity of my self, as I am not if you 
only love me for my mind.
106
  Sexual virtue is a disposition 
to pursue sex at its best.     
It is only in this sense that Geach is correct that 
the sex act is, “like the act of telling, a kind of human 
act which is, as it were, there already for us to do, whose 
generic nature is not formed by the agent‟s thought.”107    
But she misapprehends the character of the goodness of the 
act in question, which is not essentially related to its 
procreative character.  These goods are good without 
reference to reproduction.  It radically misunderstands the 
point of nonreproductive sex to say that its purpose is 
merely pleasure. 
The telos of sex that I have described has 
implications for the moral status of sex acts that fall 
short of this interpersonal ideal.  Many people are unable 
to achieve the full goodness associated with sex at its 
best, often because of the simple bad luck of never meeting 
a suitable partner.  When a given sexual act, one that 
involves no mistreatment of another person, is the best 
that is available for this person at this time, it is 
uncharitable to condemn it.  Sex at its best demands 
generosity toward human neediness and imperfection.   There 
is, then, something paradoxical and unvirtuous about 
condemning sex for being imperfect.
108
  The stigmatization 
of masturbation, for example, is senseless and destructive 
precisely because of its brutal attitude toward sexual 
neediness.   
Finally, a word about pleasure.  For the reasons just 
stated, many of the couplings that Geach condemns are 
aiming at something more than pleasurable sensations, 
fundamentally private and meaningless.  But it would be 
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strange if pleasure were never a legitimate reason for 
action.  Would Geach deny that, in the intercourse of 
married heterosexual couples that she valorizes, one 
sometimes legitimately performs intentional actions for no 
reason other than these give one‟s partner physical 
pleasure? 
 
The ex-gay movement as Trojan horse 
 
There‟s a substantial problem about the people who are 
left out of Geach‟s picture.  If her ethic‟s contribution 
to human flourishing is to be counted in its favor, then we 
should pay some attention to the ways in which it crushes 
the human spirit.  There is a very large population of 
people who are primarily sexually attracted to people of 
the same sex.  They comprise between two and ten percent of 
the population.
109
 What are they supposed to do? 
 The costs of the homosexuality taboo are well-known, 
but it is worth noting that those costs are being 
registered even within the heart of the religious right in 
America. 
 The October, 2007, issue of Christianity Today 
included a fascinating piece about the evolution of the 
“ex-gay” movement.110  The article inadvertently exposes a 
major fault line in the Christian Right‟s position on 
homosexuality. 
 The article, unsurprisingly given its venue, takes as 
unquestioned premises that homosexual desire and homosexual 
conduct are always evils to be avoided.  It notes an 
important shift in the claims being made by the “ex-gay” 
movement, a primarily Christian movement that has been 
around for some decades now, promising to lead gay people 
away from homosexuality.  In the early days of the 
movement, it claimed that a gay person could transform him- 
or herself into a heterosexual through a pure act of will.  
Those claims have now disappeared.  The article reports 
that “[e]arly hopes for instant healing have given way to 
belief that transformation occurs through a lifetime of 
discipleship.”  
                                                 
109 The number varies depending on whether measurement focuses on self-
identification (in which case the percentage is low) or on behavior (in 
which case it is higher).  Edward O. Laumann, John H. Gagnon, Robert T. 
Michael, and Stuart Michaels, The Social Organization of Sexuality: 
Sexual Practices in the United States 292-301 (1994); Richard Posner, 
Sex and Reason 294-95 (1992). 
110 Tim Stafford, An Older, Wiser Ex-Gay Movement, Christianity Today, 
Oct. 2007. 
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Alan Chambers, president of Exodus International, the 
largest of the ex-gay groups, 
is frank that change does not eradicate temptation. He 
wonders if change is ever 100 percent complete in this 
life. „One thing we can expect as Christians is a life 
of denial,‟ he says. „I don't think we're afraid to 
tell people that they may have a lifetime of struggle. 
Freedom isn't the absence of struggle, but the life of 
struggle with joy in the process.‟ 
 The ex-gay movement seeks to integrate the 
reality of same-sex attraction into a life of 
discipleship. In that lifelong journey, they expect 
many changes, including changes of feeling and 
attraction. But they emphasize that each person's 
experience is different, and that instant 
transformation is extremely rare. 
 Not surprisingly then, ex-gay ministries appeal 
almost exclusively to Christians. Most participants 
come from evangelical backgrounds and can't resolve 
their Christian faith with a gay identity. 
An accompanying article
111
 describes a recent study of 
“reparative therapy” (therapy that seeks to transform 
sexual orientation).  The study struggles to cast that 
therapy in the best possible light.  But among those who 
were deemed to have successfully converted to heterosexual, 
most 
did not report themselves to be without experience of 
homosexual arousal, and did not report heterosexual 
orientation to be unequivocal and uncomplicated. 
Sexual orientation for the individuals in this study 
(and indeed for most of us) may be considerably more 
complicated than commonly conceived, involving a 
complex interplay of what we are instinctively 
attracted to, what we can be attracted to with proper 
attention and focus, what we choose to be attracted to 
based on how we structure our interpersonal 
environments, our emotional attachments, our broader 
psychological functioning, (of course) our religious 
and moral beliefs and values, and many more factors. 
We believe the individuals who presented themselves as 
heterosexual success stories at Time 3 are 
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heterosexual in some meaningful but complicated sense 
of the term. 
 The abandonment of the claim that sexual orientation 
can easily be changed is very big news.   Poll data reveal 
that those who think homosexuality is innate are 
overwhelmingly likely to support gay rights, while those 
who think homosexuality is a choice are likely to be 
opposed.  “Of those who consider it a choice,” a New York 
Times poll reported in 1993, “only 18 percent rated it as 
acceptable, compared with 57 percent of those who regard it 
as something gay men and lesbians cannot change.”112   
 There‟s nothing illogical about thinking that 
homosexuality is innate and nonetheless opposing gay 
rights.  One can regard it as an unfortunate fact of life 
that some people are permanently denied sexual happiness.  
The Christianity Today article ends on that note:  “Our 
attractions, always disordered to some extent, must be 
submitted to Christ, who alone can redeem us. For those who 
feel strong same-sex attractions, that task is especially 
difficult. But it is the same basic struggle every 
Christian must face.” 
 But that story is a hard sell.  Americans like happy 
endings.  They like to think that if homosexual sex is 
forbidden, then another avenue to sexual fulfillment is 
easily available to gay people.  That‟s why the leadership 
of the Christian Right has tended to be quiet about the 
ambiguities in the experience of those in the ex-gay 
movement.  As recent studies of the ex-gay movement have 
shown, this has produced considerable tensions.
113
  One 
committed member of the movement denounced the hypocrisy of 
his fellow Christians: 
Most of them can‟t handle the truth.  If you‟re in the 
church and you‟re a drug addict, murderer, whatever, 
guys will come up to you and slap you on the ass.  
                                                 
112 Jeffrey Schmalz, Poll Finds an Even Split on Homosexuality‟s Cause, 
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You‟re one of the guys.  But if you state you struggle 




The appearance of the Christianity Today article is a 
significant event, because it shows that mainstream 
conservative Christianity is now willing to admit these 
uncomfortable facts.  This, however, is a decidedly 
unstable cultural formation.  It is also liable to 
slippage, as when Michael Bussee, one of the founders of 
Exodus International, fell in love with one of the members.  
They left the group together and never came back.
115
 
 The ex-gay movement is, wittingly or not, a 
progressive force in American politics.  It demands that 
the immutability claim be taken seriously, and its members 
are not easily dismissed by the religious right, because 
they agree with the religious right about nearly everything 
else.  They have a credibility and a competence in the 
pertinent theological claims that no one else can possibly 
match.  They are able to speak to their own cultural group, 
in the same way that sophisticated Islamic feminist 
theologians can speak to theirs. 
 Of course, it‟s possible to say that, even though 
Geach‟s sexual ethic will not make people happy, even 
though it will doom them to a life of struggle and 
frustration, they should accept this, because that‟s the 
right thing to do. 
 But this sits uneasily beside her invocation of the 
happy lives of those who follow the path she prescribes.  
Both “This is the Path to Happiness” and “Tough Luck, 
Happiness Isn‟t for You” are coherent positions.116  But 
it‟s hard to make them cohere with each other. 
                                                 
114 Erzen, Straight to Jesus, at 66. 
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Careful with that gun 
 
 There remains a difficulty about the line that Geach 
draws to separate licit from illicit sex.  The insistence 
on a link between sex and reproduction raises a familiar 
objection:  why is it morally permissible for infertile 
heterosexual couples to copulate?
117
 
Like the new natural law theorists, Geach focuses on 
the capacity of the heterosexual couple to engage in acts 
of the reproductive kind.  I have already reviewed the 
objections to this claim.  Geach, unlike the new natural 
lawyers, does not claim that a copulating married couple 
becomes a single organism.  Rather she responds to these 
difficulties in an original way.  She is especially 
provoked by the following passage from my work, in which I 
elaborated on the gun example, discussed earlier. 
Contingencies of deception and fright aside, all 
objects that are not loaded guns are morally 
equivalent in this context:  it is not more wrong, and 
certainly not closer to homicide, to point a gun known 
to be unloaded at someone and pull the trigger than it 
is to point one's finger and say, "bang!"  And if the 
two acts have the same moral character in this 
context, why is the same not equally true of, on the 
one hand, vaginal intercourse between a heterosexual 
couple who know they cannot reproduce, and on the 
other, anal or oral sex between any couple?  Just as, 
in the case of the gun, neither act is more homicidal 
than the other, so in the sexual cases, neither act is 
more reproductive than the other.
118
 
Geach responds:  “If gun-users in America make no such 
distinction, this must cause a lot of nasty accidents.  
Good gun practice treats the actions as utterly different:  
                                                                                                                                                 
distorted like a Francis Bacon picture, which illustrates the effects 
of sodomy on the soul.”  Id. at 554. 
117 The infertile couple is also a problem for Gallagher, who writes in 
(How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken at 45 n.34 that elderly infertile 
couples “do not contradict in any intelligible, visible way, the basic 
purposes of marriage as a childrearing institution.”  When the 70 year 
old couple marries, does anyone think that they might have children?  
She explains that “we know for a fact that including these kinds of 
opposite-sex couples doesn‟t damage the meaning of marriage as a 
childrearing institution,” id., because they‟ve always been included in 
it.  But for reasons we have already considered, same-sex marriage 
doesn‟t damage the meaning of marriage as a childrearing institution 
for the new sexual ethic.   
118 Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question, at 88. 
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one has to make a strict rule against ever pointing guns at 
people unless one seriously means to shoot someone, and if 
one killed someone by shooting him accidentally in this way 
one would be to blame for his death.”119  If one does not 
make good gun practice a habit, one damages oneself by 
making oneself into the kind of gun-user who might kill 
someone.  This, Geach concedes, is not an absolute moral 
rule; in narrowly defined circumstances, a departure from 
good gun practice might be warranted, because it would not 
necessarily damage the self in this way.  “By contrast, a 
sexual act which fails to be of generative kind directly 
attacks the fabric and constitution of our nature, since 
our sexuality and the significance of the marriage act are 
part of that fabric and constitution.”120 
 The point about good gun practice doesn‟t add much to 
the argument, since it rests on the contingency of human 
limitations.  If we had X-ray vision and could see 
instantly whether a gun was loaded, good gun practice would 
be different than it is.  If the point is that we need to 
habitually follow traditional sexual ethics because such 
rules provide a socially useful framework, even if there is 
no distinctive reason in any particular case to follow 
them, this comes dangerously close to Wax‟s position. 
The deeper question is one of coherence:  does it make 
sense to say that the significance of reproduction adheres 
to an act that is known to be incapable of reproduction?  
Geach‟s answer is the same as the NNL theorists:  
“Generation, when it takes place normally, involves a joint 
human act, which as a kind of human act is not defined as 
involving, for instance, the expedition of viable sperm, 
since the viability of sperm is a piece of recondite 
information.”121  But in given circumstances, that 
information may not be recondite at all.  Sometimes we all 
have the functional equivalent of X-ray vision.  A man may 
know perfectly well that he is infertile, or more commonly 
(in a case such as post-menopausal sex) that his wife is.  
Why is their coitus an act of the reproductive type, when 
they know for certain that it cannot possibly produce a 
pregnancy? 
 Geach observes that my objection presupposes that a 
given moral character “cannot belong to an act as being of 
a kind to produce a certain effect, unless it is in the 
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circumstances liable to produce that effect.”122  But Geach 
denies this: 
Thus, I suppose, [Koppelman] would say that it could 
make no difference to the moral character of one's 
action whether one had or had not provided 
information, if, as it happened, there was no way that 
one would be believed when one made some assertion of 
informative kind. But it could make a great difference 
to whether one had done one's job, or made one's 
protest, or warned one's enemies of the disaster about 
to overtake them. To provide information is to make an 
assertion of the kind called 'telling', which is 
distinguished from other kinds of assertion by its 
being an act of a kind to produce in the hearer belief 
of the one making the assertion. The fact that one 
will not be believed, however, does not mean that one 
is not performing the act of telling, and whether or 
not one has actually told someone something can make a 
great difference to the character of one's action, 
even if one is not trying to make him believe one.
123
 
 Much depends on what is meant by “the fact that one 
will not be believed.”  Suppose that I‟m trying to warn my 
enemy that the bridge he‟s determined to cross is going to 
collapse and plunge him to his death.  I can be fairly 
sure, given his characteristic stubbornness and stupidity, 
that he‟s going to disregard my warning.  I‟m obligated to 
warn him nonetheless.   
But when I do that, I have to use means that I think 
have some chance of getting through to him, and I have to 
reasonably hope that this time I will get through to him.  
Stubborn, stupid people sometimes unexpectedly reform.  (We 
are born stubborn and stupid.)  If it is absolutely 
impossible for him to be informed, then my telling him is 
as pointless as if I told him the truth in a foreign 
language which he does not understand.  One isn‟t 
“performing an act of informative kind” if “one makes one‟s 
statement out of earshot.”124 
 Geach thinks that the analogous case is that “one is 
not performing an act of reproductive kind unless there is 
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reproductive complementarity.”125  But why is my act of the 
reproductive kind if I am ejaculating into an infertile 
vagina (but not of the reproductive kind if I ejaculate 
anywhere else)?  Why isn‟t this just like a truthful 
statement made out of earshot?  As our discussion of Lee 
and George, above, showed, a hopeless struggle is admirable 
only if there is some rational vestige of hope present.  
Otherwise it‟s just silly.  The surgeon can‟t perform a 
healing-type act upon a corpse.  Come to think of it, it 





  A common refrain among opponents of same-sex marriage 
– all the writers I have critiqued here partake of it - is 
the importance of defending “the family.”  They feel that 
the institution of the family, as they conceive it, will be 
undermined if same-sex marriages are recognized.  This is a 
peculiar kind of argument, and it traps them in a paradox 
that has a remarkable historical precedent. 
 In the Civil War, the Southerners frequently declared 
that they were fighting for liberty and self-government.  
The title of James McPherson‟s history of the Civil War, 
Battle Cry of Freedom, capitalizes on the fact that, as 
McPherson writes, “[b]oth sides . . . professed to be 
fighting for freedom.”126  Jefferson Davis declared in 1863 
that the South was “forced to take up arms to vindicate the 
political rights, the freedom, equality, and State 
sovereignty which were the heritage purchased by the blood 
of our revolutionary sires.”127  But the freedom that Davis 
was fighting for depended, of course, on the enslavement of 
others.  The southern commissioners to Britain reported 
home that “the public mind here is entirely opposed to the 
Government of the Confederate States of America on the 
question of slavery. . . . The sincerity and universality 
of this feeling embarrass the government in dealing with 
the question of our recognition.”128 
Opponents of same-sex marriage today face a similar 
embarrassment.  They are eager to protect their distinctive 
conception of family.  But that conception depends on 
marginalizing the families of others and denying them legal 
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recognition.  In the long run, the invocation of “family” 
as a reason to beat up on gay people will seem as weird as 
the invocation of “freedom” did as a defense of the 
Confederacy. 
 
